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Abstract: This study contrasts two national solar home system (SHS) programs that relied on the 
same World Bank approach, but reached dramatically different results.  The Energy Services 
Delivery Project (ESDP) in Sri Lanka was an exemplary renewable energy access program, 
successfully installing 21,000 off-grid SHSs alongside grid-connected mini-hydro capacity and 
off-grid village hydroelectric systems.  It reached all of its targets ahead of schedule and below 
cost.  By contrast, the Indonesia Solar Home System Project (ISHSP), which ran from 1997 to 
2003, sought to reach one million rural Indonesians through the sales and installation of 200,000 
SHSs.  However, by project closing in 2003, less than five percent of the original sales target, or 
only 8,054 units, had been installed.  The ESDP and ISHSP were the World Bank’s first foray 
into a “market-based renewable energy services provision model.”  Based on original research 
interviews and field observation, the article finds that contrasting the two programs—one a 
success, the other a failure—offers lessons for energy and development practitioners, namely that 
effective programs are those that select appropriate technology, often with input from households 
themselves; they promote community participation and ownership; and they have robust 
marketing, demonstration, and promotion activities. 
 
Keywords: rural energy use; energy poverty; energy security; solar photovoltaic (PV) panels; 
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1. Introduction 
Lack of access to electricity and dependence on traditional fuels for cooking and heating 
remains an enduring economic development issue for many countries, one that has catalyzed 
significant international momentum towards universal energy access via initiatives such as 
Sustainable Energy for All and the Sustainable Development Goal 7 (Ockwell and Byrne 2017; 
International Energy Agency 2017; Gollwitzer et al. 2018).   The International Energy Agency 
(2018) estimates that worldwide about $13 billion in capital is invested at improving access to 
electricity or cooking devices annually.   
To meet these targets, channel this investment, and capture some of the plentiful co-
benefits of energy access (such as reductions in poverty, gender empowerment, improved health, 
and skills development, to name a few), a variety of programs and business models have 
blossomed over the past decades (Chaurey et al. 2012; Sovacool 2013a; Halff et al. 2014).  As 
merely a glimpse of the depth and complexity of actions, between 2011 and 2015, more than 106 
countries have actively and formally engaged with Sustainable Energy for All and provided  
financial or in-kind contributions or working on tailored national strategies and investment plans 
(Sustainable Energy for All 2016).  One of the most significant technologies for expanding 
access to modern energy services within these approaches is solar electrification, especially via 
solar home systems, or SHSs (Ulsrud et al. 2015; Ulsrud et al. 2018 Ockwell et al. 2018; 
Venkateswaran et al. 2018). 
Despite the abundance of actors promoting solar (and other) energy options, however, 
one of the most influential remains the World Bank. The World Bank Group (WBG) is a major 
source of financing for energy and infrastructure projects including pipelines, oil and gas fields, 
and power plants as well as off-grid energy systems such as solar home systems and micro-hydro 
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dams.  The World Bank in particular is a multilateral institution that provides loans and credit to 
developing countries to stimulate social and economic development in an attempt to alleviate 
poverty (Clark 1999; Sovacool 2017).   
This comparative study contrasts two World Bank funded national SHS programs—one 
in Sri Lanka, and one in Indonesia—that relied on the same approach but reached dramatically 
different results.  The Energy Services Delivery Project (ESDP) in Sri Lanka cost-effectively 
installed 21,000 off-grid SHSs and a series of village hydroelectric systems ahead of schedule 
and below cost.1  By contrast, the Indonesian Solar Home System Project (ISHSP) reached less 
than five percent of its target, or only 8,054 units.  The ESDP and ISHSP were the World Bank’s 
first foray into what has now become known as a “market-based renewable energy services 
provision model.”  Based on original interviews and field research in both countries, this study 
explores the dynamics of both programs as well as implications for energy access policy more 
generally.    
In contrasting the ESDP with the ISHSP, the article aims to make three contributions. 
First, and critically, it analyzes a case of success, commonly referred to as “best practice,” 
alongside a case of failure, or “worst practice.”   We took a rather simple notion of failure to 
mean a “successful” project met its goals or produced benefits that exceeded costs; a “failed” 
project did not meet its goals or had costs that outweighed benefits.  In doing so, the study 
identifies not only the programmatic factors that often result in the success or failure of 
individual case studies, but also the extent that the complex agendas of international and bilateral 
energy and development agencies, manufacturers, research planners, politicians, and community 
                                                 
1 Admittedly, some of the program’s successes have since been obviated by massive investments in grid 
electrification. AS these occurred after the project’s close, they are outside the scope of this study, although they are 
discussed in Sovacool and Drupady 2012 and Sovacool 2013b.  
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leaders harmonize, or hinder, programmatic efforts. Both the energy policy community and 
perhaps the development community as a whole need to better understand the dynamics of 
failure alongside the better-known reasons for success.   
Second, this study delves into how both Sri Lankan and Indonesian planners attempted to 
supply energy services in moments of crisis. Sri Lanka was undertaking the ESDP as they 
dismantled the functions of the welfare state, promoted privatization and restructuring, and 
emerged from a 26-year old civil war—providing insight for how such tensions can be managed 
(Caron 2002).  Indonesia was similarly dealing with the Asian Financial Crisis as its national 
program was unfolding (Sovacool and Drupady 2012).   
Third, the study illuminates how the World Bank designs and implements their energy 
projects.  The WBG’s annual average lending ranges $60 to $70 billion in loans, grants, equity 
investments, and loan guarantees (World Bank 2015), making it the largest international 
development bank in the world.  Though it operates independently, the WBG’s major 
shareholders are France, Germany, Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom, and its 
major borrowers are Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and Russia.  Understanding the 
internal dynamics, processes, and accountability mechanisms of the WBG is therefore of 
importance for both scholars of environmental governance and energy policy and practitioners of 
multilateral financial aid.  Keohane (2002) describes institutions such as the WBG as “organized 
anarchies” created to reduce transaction costs, facilitate information, and empower agents to 
orchestrate complicated actions.  This study therefore underscores the differing contextual 
factors that can hamper or stymie WBG efforts (and perhaps those facing other, similar 
multilateral financial institutions).   
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2. Case study selection and background: 
 This section briefly justifies Sri Lanka and Indonesia as case studies before summarizing 
the specific dynamics of each of their national SHS programs.   
2.1 Sri Lanka’s Energy Services Delivery Project (ESDP) 
At the turn of the millennium, Sri Lanka faced a series of daunting energy security and 
development challenges.  It was primarily a biomass centered energy sector, with 47.4 percent of 
demand met from fuelwood and dung, 43 percent petroleum, and 9.5 percent hydropower (Sri 
Lanka Sustainable Energy Authority 2009).  Seventy percent of households depended on 
biomass, mostly for cooking, and electricity represented only 7 percent of overall energy use. 
Moreover, 60 percent of household demand for electricity went to one use only, lighting 
(Nagendran 2001).  About half of the population earned less than $2 per day (Integrated 
Development Association 2004).   
To minimize the health implications of households biomass use, diversify the energy 
sector, and improve incomes for communities, the WBG and Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
initiated the $55.3 million ESDP Project in 1997.  The ESDP aggressively promoted SHSs 
alongside various community based micro-hydro projects, a wind energy pilot, and energy 
efficiency investments.  Its key objectives were to provide electricity to rural households, 
strengthen the regulatory environment in favor of energy efficiency, improve private sector 
performance, and reduce carbon emissions (Sovacool 2013b).   
The Credit Line Component was the largest part of the ESDP, and the one most relevant 
to it solar targets.  It provided medium and long-term financing, targeting rural households 
themselves, contrasted with other ESDP components such as micro-hydro, targeted for village 
cooperatives, tea estate management companies, and independent power producers.  One 
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defining characteristic of the Credit Line was its phased-reduction of grants.  Rather than cover 
costs entirely, the component gave a series of grants on a sliding scale.  At the start of the 
program, all SHS received a 15 to 20 percent subsidy.  The GEF, a partner, also gave 
performance-based grants if costs declined or efficiency improved.  SHS dealers received a 
$2.30 subsidy per Watt-peak (Wp) for offering smaller sized systems over time.  However, these 
grants were slowly phased out so that by 2002 they covered only 8 to 12 percent for SHS, and by 
2004 they did not exist at all.  Vendors generally responded either by improving the efficiency of 
their operations to keep costs low, or by reducing their inventory.  In 2002, the Credit Line 
Component was also modified to include microfinance institutions and Sarvodaya Economic 
Enterprises Development Services (SEEDS) agreed to manage the program.  SHS penetration 
quickly grew, jumping to more than 3,200 SHS sold in 2000 (Nagendran and Iyer 2001) and 
eventual system sales of 1,300 per month (Kapadia 2003).    
A capacity-building component supported a wide array of capacity building activities.  
One of the first tasks to be undertaken was an extensive feasibility study of 1,048 villages to 
determine possible sites for SHS deployment.  It was this collection of initial market surveys and 
pre-investment studies where planners discovered that end users were willing to pay slightly 
more upfront if energy services were more reliable and safer—e.g., SHS were perceived more 
favorably than kerosene and diesel.  The ESDP established a Technical Advisory Committee to 
set standards for manufacturers.  It provided funds for the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) to 
prepare a National Renewable Energy Strategy and establish a Pre-Electrification Unit within the 
utility to provide support and training to the Credit Component discussed above.  Funds were 
also available to participating credit institutions (PCIs) to prepare feasibility studies, business 
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plans, and document bank loans, and grants were given to developers and village organizations 
to raise awareness about the ESDP and promote the proper installation of equipment.   
The ESDP was an unqualified success.  It achieved all of its targets below cost and ahead 
of its determined closing date of 2002, successfully installing 21,000 off-grid SHS along with 
more than 31 MW of micro-hydro power at grid-connected and village scales, and a 3 MW grid-
connected wind farm.  By the end of 2004, two years after the ESDP’s close, the Sri Lankan 
renewable energy industry had more than 40 mini-hydro developers, 10 registered solar 
companies, 22 registered village hydro developers, and 12 village hydro equipment suppliers 
compared to less than 3 of each before the ESDP began.  Roughly three times the ESDP’s 
budget, $150 million, was invested in the market from 1998 to 2004 (Sovacool 2013b).  
Furthermore, the ESDP attracted private sector developers into the renewable energy sector 
through public-private partnerships, set national grid interconnection and tariff standards, and 
instigated the formation of hydro, wind, solar, and energy efficiency industry groups. 
2.2 Indonesia’s Solar Home System Project (ISHSP) 
Indonesia is a vast, sprawling archipelago of more than 13,600 islands covering an area of 
roughly two million square kilometers or a little less than three times the size of Texas (the second 
largest state in the United States). Known as the “spice islands” throughout much of its history, it 
is the largest country in Southeast Asia both in terms of population and size, and it is blessed with 
an abundance of natural resources. In 1995, the country was still riding a wave of high economic 
growth resulting from the dramatic increase in oil export revenues in the 1970s (World Bank 2011). 
Moreover, the abundant oil and gas sectors were supplying over 85 percent of the country’s 
commercial net energy consumption (World Bank 1996).  
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However, a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of $1,014 placed Indonesia sixth out 
of 10 countries in Southeast Asia.  Approximately 17.6 percent of its 199 million people (roughly 
35 million of them) lived below the national poverty line (World Bank 2011) and more alarmingly, 
60 percent of all Indonesians still had no access to basic electricity services (World Bank 1996).  
With 70 percent of the population still living in rural areas, expanding rural electrification was 
integral to the government’s economic development strategy.  Rural electrification coverage in 
Indonesia was still at 40 percent – well below the regional average (World Bank 1996).  In 1995, 
however, a local entrepreneur in West Java managed to sell 4,000 SHS units on credit in the first 
year of operation (Miller and Hope 2000). Seemingly, technological innovations coupled with the 
availability of compatible and energy-efficient devices had made the SHS market more 
competitive. Thus, in the absence of grid connection, the lesson appeared to be that rural 
households were willing to pay market prices for a reliable alternative (Sovacool and Drupady 
2012), and a window of opportunity was emerging. 
These market trends convinced planners to embark on “something big” to simultaneously 
validate the World Bank’s energy strategy and meet Indonesian rural energy targets.  The 
Indonesia SHS Project set an ambitious target of selling and installing 200,000 SHS (10 MWp) to 
supply electricity to approximately one million rural villagers.  The Indonesia SHS Project ran 
from 1997 to 2003 and was valued at $118.1 million equivalent, with seed money of $44.3 million 
equivalent or 38 percent of the project costs to be provided by the WBG and the GEF (World Bank 
2004). It was to be a massive undertaking, requiring serious investments to be made into both 
developing Indonesia’s solar photovoltaic (PV) market and formulating a national energy access 
policy to incentivize the adoption of renewable energy technologies.  
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However, rather than relying on government funding, the bulk of the project’s costs of $67.3 
million was to be financed mainly on credit from sub-borrowers (SHS dealers) and end-users (rural 
customers) as summarized in Table 1. The idea was to target only those villagers willing and able 
to pay for electricity services in order to nurture and develop a self-sustaining solar PV sector. 
Table 1: Sharing of Project Costs in the Indonesian Solar Home System Project 
Stakeholder Project Cost $ % of Total 
World Bank  
GEF Grant 
Government of Indonesia  
Participating Banks  
Sub-borrowers/End-users 
20 
24.3 
1.5 
5 
67.3 
17 
21 
1 
4 
57 
TOTAL 118.1 100 
 
The main part of the project was the credit component which sought to extend electricity 
services to about one million people through the sale and installation of 200,000, 50 Wp SHS units 
to rural households and small commercial establishments like the one depicted in Figure 1. A $20 
million equivalent International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) loan 
channeled through four commercial participating banks (PBs) provided a credit facility to address 
the high cost of SHS units and the financial constraints of dealers and potential customers. 
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Figure 1: A Small Commercial Establishment Powered by Lights from an SHS, Indonesia 
 
Rural areas that could not expect grid connection from PLN in the next three years or more 
were identified in the provinces of West Java, Lampung, and South Sulawesi as potential regional 
markets, with the intent of including North Sumatera at a later stage. All these provinces had rural 
communities with strong purchasing power due to cash crops such as coffee, cacao, and palm oil 
(World Bank 2004).  West Java was additionally selected due to the initial success of the local 
entrepreneur mentioned above and also because of proximity to the capital, Jakarta. A population 
of 38 million easily made it the most populous province in Indonesia at the time, with 19 million 
people still waiting for electricity and other critical infrastructure (Retnanestri 2007). 
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A project-approved 50 Wp SHS unit with the necessary components, the only one eligible 
under the program, cost between $550 and $800 at that time, depending on the sales location 
(World Bank 2004). Dealers would typically offer credit to prospective customers based on a first 
cost buy-down in the range of $75 to $100, funded by a separate GEF grant mentioned below. This 
would bring down the unit cost balance to a level that could be paid in monthly installments over 
a period of four to five years, in amounts roughly comparable to conventional monthly energy 
expenditures for kerosene. Customers would in turn be responsible for servicing their own systems, 
although dealers could provide service contracts or guarantees for a limited period. 
The World Bank estimated that credit installments and the interest generated would provide 
approximately $66.8 million equivalent of the project costs. In addition, a GEF grant of $20 million 
equivalent, translating into a first-cost subsidy ranging from $75 to $125 for every SHS unit sold, 
would be awarded to each dealer upon extending credit to customers. This benefit could either be 
passed on to customers to make the SHS units even more affordable or be used to further develop 
the business (for example to recruit new staff, establish new rural outlets, or expand product 
inventory). 
Despite the promising signs from West Java, the size of the project’s budget, and its 
distribution of risks via a market based approach, the ISHSP was essentially a failure.  During its 
years of operation from 1997 to 2003, it installed only slightly more than 8,000 units, had 
negligible effects on solar manufacturing, and limited impacts to Indonesia’s rural energy balance. 
3. Research Methods: Interviews, Field Research, and Focus Groups  
Primary data for this article comes predominately from research interviews and field 
research as part of research project on energy security in Asia (see Sovacool and Drupady 2012; 
Sovacool 2013b as well as acknowledgments), in addition to project documents and a sampling 
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of the academic literature. A semi-structured research interview format enabled the research 
team to ask experts involved with the ESDP and ISHSP a set of standard inquiries but then 
allowed the conversation to build and deviate to explore new directions and areas.   The team 
relied on qualitative methods because many of the variables of interest, such as the ongoing 
energy policy challenges facing Sri Lanka or Indonesia and the factors explaining the success of 
the ESDP and ISHSP, were difficult to measure, and cannot be described purely with numerical 
analysis.   
The research team conducted 92 interviews at 50 institutions.  For every interview the 
author had simultaneous real-time translation into Sinhalese, Tamil, and Bahasa when necessary.  
A purposive sampling strategy was employed, meaning experts with extensive knowledge of the 
ESDP or ISHSP were chosen to participate, and a critical stakeholder analysis framework was 
utilize to include respondents from government, civil society, business, academia, and local 
communities.  Respondents therefore came from: 
• Government agencies including the Agency for the Development and Implementation of 
Technology (BPPT), the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR), and the 
Ministry of Research and Technology (MENRISTEK) in Indonesia, as well as the Sri 
Lanka Sustainable Energy Authority, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Power and 
Energy; 
• The international donor community including the Asian Development Bank, the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency, the International Finance Corporation, and the World 
Bank; 
• Civil society organizations including the Indonesian Renewable Energy Society, 
Transparency International, Yayasan Bina Usaha Lingkungan, and Yayasan Pelangi 
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Indonesia, as well as the Institute for Participatory Interaction in Development, Energy 
Forum of Sri Lanka, and Solar Energy Association of Sri Lanka; 
• Private sector companies including PT. Gerbang Multindo Nusantara, PT. Mambruk 
Indonesia, and PT. Trimbasolar in Indonesia, and Hashakee Power (Pvt) Ltd, Alpha Solar 
Energy Systems (Pvt) Limited, and Vallibel Power in Sri Lanka;  
• Financial Institutions including CIMB Niaga Bank and Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) in 
Indonesia, and the Development Finance Corporation of Ceylon (DFCC) Bank and Lankia 
Orix Leasing Company (LOLC) in Sri Lanka;  
• Local universities, research institutions and think tanks including the Indonesian Institute 
for Energy Economics, the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), and the University of 
Moratuwa in Sri Lanka. 
In Sri Lanka, these interviews took place not only in Colombo, the capital, but also Battaramulla, 
Dagama, Hambantota , Meddawatte, Moratuwa, Watawala, and Yatiyanthota, as well as the 
World Bank headquarters in Washington, DC, United States.  In Indonesia, interviews took place 
not only in Jakarta but also Jangari Village (West Java), Lake Cirata (West Java), and Serdang 
Village (Lampung).   
          During these research interviews, participants were asked (a) identify the benefits of the 
ESDP and ISHSP, (b) summarize some of the key barriers to implementation it had to confront, 
and (c) discuss general lessons that it offers energy policy and development practitioners.  Due to 
Institutional Review Board guidelines and grant requirements, as well as the request of some 
participants, such data is presented as anonymous in the study, though information from the 
interviews was often digitally recorded and always carefully coded. 
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To ensure a degree of triangulation and reliability, research interviews were augmented 
with direct observation and site visits to four solar energy facilities shown in Table 2.  These 
included a mix of different provinces and technologies.  The site visits allowed the research team 
to discuss the implications of the ESDP and ISHSP with actual renewable energy operators, 
managers, and manufacturers.  They also served as a useful vehicle to arrange additional research 
interviews.  
Table 2: Solar Energy Site Visits in Sri Lanka and Indonesia 
 
Name Capacit
y 
Cost (Rs) Owner/Operato
r 
Date 
Operationa
l 
Location Connectio
n 
Directly 
Supporte
d by 
ESDP or 
ISHSP  
Indigolla 
Village 
3.2 kW 
on 80 
Homes 
2,880,00
0 
Individual 
Households 
1998 Indigolla, 
North 
Western 
Province, 
Sri Lanka 
Off-Grid Yes 
Dagama 
Village 
2.0 kW 
on 50 
Homes 
 
2,000,00
0 
Individual 
Households 
1999 Dagama, 
North 
Western 
Province, 
Sri Lanka 
Off-Grid Yes 
Ponnilawa 
Village 
1.8 kW 
on 50 
Homes 
1,980,00
0 
Individual 
Households 
1998 Ponnilawa, 
North 
Western 
Province, 
Sri Lanka 
Off-Grid Yes 
Trimba Solar 
Demonstratio
n Facility 
- - Manufacturer 
of solar 
modules, street 
lamps, batteries  
 PT. 
Trimbasola
r 
- Jakarta, 
Indonesia 
 
The research team lastly supplemented interviews, site visits, and community 
consultations with an extensive review of reports and peer-reviewed articles relating to energy 
policy in both countries.   
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4. The political economy of solar success: Sri Lanka 
As this section of the paper argues, that the ESDP was a success is practically 
incontrovertible (Sovacool 2013b).  It exceeded every one of its targets, ahead of schedule, and 
below cost, achievements summarized in Table 3.  It connected 16 micro-hydro plants to the 
national grid, served 22,685 off-grid households, built the wind farm, and met all of its energy 
efficiency goals (World Bank 2003; United Nations Development Program 2012).  Project 
documents estimated savings of 140,000 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent at an incremental cost 
of $52 per ton; in actuality, 514,000 tons were displaced at a cost below $19 per ton.   
Table 3: Achievements of the ESDP in Sri Lanka 
Component Progress at Project Closing 
ESDP Credit 
Line 
Installed  31 MW of micro-hydro serving the grid (16 projects) and 0.94 MW of solar plus 574 
kW of village hydro (35 projects) serving 22,685 off-grid customers in aggregate 
 
CEB signed 14 SPPAs by mid-term review and 37 by project close 
 
Small Purchase Power Agreement Contracts and Tariffs published and updated by CEB since 
2000 
 
Interconnection standards published in December 2000 
Wind Farm 3 MW wind farm commissioned in March 1999 
Capacity 
Building 
Saved 82 GWh per year of energy and displaced the need to build 32.5 MW of electricity 
capacity 
 
Commercial energy efficiency building codes issued in April 2001 
 
Trained 748 CEB and energy professionals through 26 programs on energy efficiency 
 
Created an electric appliance labelling program.   
 
On-premises load metering of 15 major customers completed 
 
Various training and awareness campaigns implemented  
 
Note: MW=megawatt.  kW=kilowatt.  CEB=Ceylon Electricity Board.  SPPAs=small power 
purchase agreements.  GWh=Gigawatt-hour.   
 
Given the focus of this comparative study, the remainder of this subsection will focus 
exclusively on the solar home system component.  At the close of the project, Sri Lanka was 
home to a vibrant industry of suppliers, developers, consultants, and trainers in the renewable 
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energy sector, with 4 major solar companies compared to 2 at the start, and 15 developers 
compared to 2 at the start.  Eighty electricity consumer associates existed compared to less than 
10 at the start.  Although the program started with dependence on Nepali technology, by its end 
Sri Lankan manufacturing had reached the point where they were exporting systems to overseas 
markets in Asia and Africa.  DFCC Bank, the Administrative Unit (AU), was approached in 
December 2002 to distribute an additional 6,000 SHS outside of the project’s scope.  As one 
respondent proclaimed, “ESDP has had a lasting, positive mark on the renewable energy industry 
in Sri Lanka – it laid the entire foundation, caused a complete shift in the country’s energy 
planning.”  And here’s the kicker: it achieved all of these benefits below cost, budgeted for $55.2 
million but spending only $44.5 million—savings that resulted from a combination of the 
creation of economies of scale, technological learning, and capacity building. 
The next three subsections focus inductively on three of the most significant benefits 
from the solar component to the EFSD: accelerated household adoption, income generation, and 
the improvement of industry technical standards and training.  
4.1 Accelerated diffusion of solar home systems 
At the peak of the SHS subcomponent, after SEEDs became a PCI more than 1,300 
systems were being sold each month, and four major vendors—Shell Solar, Access Solar, 
SELCO, and Alpha Thermal—established national networks.  Only a few systems were sold 
nationwide in 1998, but almost 20,000 had been sold by 2001.  Planners realized that as areas 
became “saturated” with SHS units vendors tended to close their shops and move to provinces 
where demand was “fresh,” essentially leaving no dedicated maintenance support facilities.   
The ESDP therefore supported the creation of 80 permanent service and distribution 
centers with $5 million invested from the private sector.  Over the duration of the ESDP, overall 
Political economy of solar electrification 17 
 
employment in the industry jumped from 50 to 1,500, and a Social Industry Association was 
established.  As the owner of one major solar distributor noted, “Before the ESDP, we were 
selling 5 or 6 systems per month in town areas, not rural areas, and we had one branch office in 
Colombo; now, we’re installing 40 to 50 systems per month, mostly in rural areas throughout 
five branches.”  
Table 4 shows that most of these systems ended up being 20 to 40Wp (32 percent) and 40 
to 60 Wp (59 percent), and the subcomponent had a tiered subsidy which gave larger 
disbursements for smaller, less expensive systems.  As Figure 2 shows, total installed capacity 
jumped from practically zero MWp in 1999 to almost 1 MWp in 2002 when the ESDP ended, 
growing to a staggering 5.5 MWp in 2008 (when sales started to plateau) with an annual turnover 
of $40 million.  The program also saw the costs of SHS decline, from $11 per Wp in 1998 to 
slightly less than $10 per Wp in 2002. 
Table 4: Details about the SHS Subcomponent of the ESDP  
System Size Percentage of 
Total Sales 
ESDP Subsidy given to consumers 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
10 to 20 Wp 2% $40 $40 $40 
20 to 40 Wp 32% $70 $70  
40 to 60 Wp 59% $70   
60 to 120 Wp 1% $0   
 
Figure 2: SHS Sold and Installed Capacity Installed in Sri Lanka, 1999 to 2009 
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4.2 Community energy and income generation  
Rising community incomes, and potent participation from local banks and villages in the 
ESDP, is also a testament to its success.  Over the course of the project, PCIs contributed $16 
million of their own funds, several nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were operating in 
tandem with the ESDP project areas, and more than 30 villages were asking for solar or micro-
hydro systems (World Bank 2003).  As one bank manager told us, “we weren’t participating out 
of any sense of charity, we were driven by commercial viability.”  Members of the AU also told 
the research team that “no major complaints” had ever arisen regarding the SHS and grid-
connected components.    
Indeed, an extensive survey done by the World Bank at the close of the project found that 
energy access through the ESDP promoted income generating activities, increased safety, longer 
studying, and a variety of other activities shown in Figure 3.   SHS units, for example, cost only 
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$750 over ten years at that time, including battery replacement, but many rural homes spend 
$650 per year on kerosene and automotive batteries—meaning units paid for themselves quite 
quickly.  
Figure 3: Social Impacts of ESDP Project on Rural Households 
 
Source: Research interviews.  
Many of these benefits were confirmed by an independent, follow-up study by the United 
Nations Development Program (2012). That study found that SHS reduced kerosene 
consumption even more from 11 liters to 0.7 liters, and eliminated expenditures on charging 
batteries in 93 percent of households.  Moreover, 50 to 90 percent of households surveyed stated 
that access to electricity from SHS provided better lighting, led to longer studying hours, a 
greater sense of safety and security, and facilitated the introduction of televisions. electric irons, 
radios and mobile phones.   
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4.3 Industrial technical standards and effective sales techniques  
Though perhaps more difficult to measure than the other components, the ESDP 
strengthened capacity in a variety of ways.  For the SHS subcomponent, the ESDP supported the 
design and enforcement of technical specifications for SHS and also trained technicians to 
conduct spot checks, develop after sales service models, and provide customers a way to lodge 
complaints.  
Part of what drove such high sales and satisfaction levels were new sales techniques 
developed and perfected with technical assistance from the ESDP.  One was displaying products 
to large groups of people rather than individuals; vendors and PCIs sent speakers with units to 
garment factories, schools, and hospitals, giving demonstrations and/or answering questions 
during lunch breaks or between shifts.  Another was innovative displays: as one respondent put 
it, “our rural salespeople went and fixed SHS in temples, churches, and community centers so 
people could literally see what they could do.”  Another was door to door visits for SHS done at 
night, so people could see firsthand what rechargeable torches and electric lights can offer them. 
A fourth was dealers traveling by motorbike to loan sample systems for a single night so 
households could become familiar with solar electricity.  A fifth was targeting women as 
beneficiaries since household surveys revealed that electricity access benefitted them the most—
as it enabled labor saving appliances, reduced household chores, provided access to 
entertainment, and positively impacted family routines.  A sixth was sending along bank officers 
with the technicians doing demonstrations so interested community members could sign up on 
the spot.  
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5. The political economy of solar failure: Sri Lanka 
The ISHSP seemed ready to promote SHSs at the same scale and scope of the ESDP, through 
the implementation of its credit and implementation support components, as well as through its 
assistance to the solar PV industry. However, soon after the project became effective in October 
1997, it became clear that its design needed a major overhaul owing to the rapidly deteriorating 
economic and political situation in Indonesia following the Asian Financial Crisis. The devaluation 
of the Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) against the United States Dollar had resulted in a severe credit 
crunch in the banking sector, “the worst since the 1970s,” according to one respondent. Two of 
the four PBs closed down; whereas the other two were barred by Bank Indonesia from offering 
credit until 2000 (World Bank 2004).  Concomitantly, the high import content of SHS units had 
increased their price more than three-fold, hampering the ability of both dealers and potential 
customers to sell or buy SHS units. 
Starting from 1998, significant changes were made including revising sales targets from 
200,000 to 70,000 SHS units; reducing the standard size of the SHS units sold from 50 Wp to a 
minimum of 10 Wp; adjusting the GEF grant to a $2 per Wp subsidy instead of a per system 
subsidy; closing the IBRD loan due to lack of demand for credit; and canceling the “Decentralized 
Rural Electrification Study and SHS Implementation Plan” (World Bank 2004).   
Unfortunately, these measures proved ineffective. The World Bank (2004: 15) admitted that 
the project became plagued by “slow progress of the SHS sales, weak investment in rural 
distribution networks, and inability of the banks to make loans to SHS dealers.” Our interviews 
with key stakeholders reflecting on the project years onwards suggest that the reasons for project 
failure may have been more fundamental, and that perhaps the financial crisis became an excuse 
rather than a major impetus. 
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 Indeed, in this section, we inductively draw from the data to summarize three core factors 
behind the program’s failure: high capital costs, a poorly designed credit vehicle, and inadequate 
dealer support.   
5.1 High capital costs in a time of crisis 
Lacking a workable credit facility to make systems more affordable and a proper supply 
chain to reduce transaction costs, the development of the solar PV market was further impeded by 
several factors that the project design was not able to rectify.  Certainly, the financial crisis affected 
the purchasing power of many potential customers that saw slumps in the value of their cash crops.  
Most damaging, however, was that the project had to bear foreign exchange costs of imported SHS 
components amounting to approximately $85 million equivalent, or more than 70 percent of 
project costs (World Bank 1996).  Solar panels, the most expensive component, were imported 
from Japan, Korea, and Germany. Some SHS parts such as charge controllers, batteries, and 
energy-efficient bulbs were already being produced domestically at the time, yet contained a 
significant amount of imported parts and materials. 
Unsurprisingly, dealers used the opportunity of the financial crisis to venture into foreign 
solar PV markets and benefit from the much stronger US Dollar. The Implementation Completion 
Report cites the success of certain dealers in exporting balance of system components to Sri Lanka 
as part of the World Bank’s ESDP as well as for commercial sales in Kenya (World Bank 2004).  
Respondents felt that instead of subsidizing foreign PV markets, the project could have 
invested some of this funding into developing the domestic solar PV assembling and 
manufacturing industry, which would have gradually brought down dependence on imports and 
consequent high SHS costs. Although the BPPT did make some inroads in this direction, the 
industry is still underdeveloped today, very much dependent on imported content, and so far unable 
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to reap the benefits of economies of scale, despite the fact that the country has recovered 
remarkably from the financial crisis. 
5.2 Mismatched credit vehicle and a weak banking sector  
The project’s credit component was ill equipped from the beginning to help the fledging 
solar PV industry overcome first cost hurdles. This was mainly due to a poorly conceived credit 
facility that failed to provide the suitable financial infrastructure and banking products for a rural 
clientele, and to support struggling SHS dealers.  
At the start of the project, Indonesia’s solar PV market was what the World Bank 
characterized as in a “high price low volume” equilibrium (World Bank 2004).  As SHSs are self-
contained generation and distribution systems, the initial capital cost is very high in proportion to 
the total operating and maintenance costs over the lifecycle – in many cases, representing almost 
one year of income in low- and middle-income rural households (Cabraal et al. 1997).  Moreover, 
under Indonesian banking practices, commercial banks were only allowed to offer credit over a 
period of one or two years, which is hardly an affordable period of cost amortization for such 
households. Despite the various measures that had been put into place under the project, the World 
Bank (2004: 21) noted “a lack of established high-volume supplier-dealer chains, high prices, and 
a lack of term credit” continued to hamper market development. 
As mentioned above, a $20 million equivalent IBRD loan was channeled through Bank 
Indonesia to four PBs to provide SHS dealers with access to capital investment and to allow them 
to offer credit lines to prospective customers. Due to repercussions of the Asian Financial Crisis, 
however, two of the selected PBs were not able to participate due to their dire financial situation; 
whereas the other two remained wary of Bank Indonesia’s increasingly strict regulations on non-
performing loans (NPLs) even after their recapitalization was completed in the middle of 2000. In 
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the end, only one PB was prepared to offer any credit, and despite keen interest from SHS dealers, 
only $0.1 million of the $20 million loan was utilized before the World Bank (2004) decided to 
close it down at the end of 2000, fifteen months ahead of schedule.  Subsequently, five out of the 
six dealers that had committed to the project went out of business, with reports of NPLs 
overpopulating the market. 
Our interview data suggests that the design of the credit facility focused too much on 
mobilizing SHS dealers and too little on aligning to the priorities and concerns of PBs and building 
their capacity as the managers of the funds. Apart from the financial crisis, the risk-averseness of 
the PBs was also due to their lack of familiarity with the rural market in general and solar PV 
technology in particular. Serving rural customers with limited income and assets would have 
required experience in rural banking products such as microfinance, as well as a strong presence 
on the ground, the collective domain of the thousands of government cooperatives and 
microfinance institutions, one of which is pictured in Figure 4. In addition, PBs would have to 
experiment with a business model they did not understand. “Renewable energy projects are very 
risky compared to coal projects,” claimed one respondent, “We do not have the requisite 
knowledge to finance them.” Another admitted, “We would not know what to do with reacquired 
SHSs in the case of defaulting customers, unlike with motorcycles,” referring to the popularity of 
credit lines for motorcycles. 
Figure 4: A Small Cooperative on Lake Cirata, West Java, Indonesia 
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At the same time, it appears that potential customers, at least in some target communities, 
did not properly understand the supposed benefits of the credit facility. Among the SHS users we 
interviewed, some had made use of the available credit to pay for their systems, but an equal 
number of respondents had paid cash, as they were unfamiliar with the banking practices in 
general. These respondents generally represented households that were in the upper-income 
bracket of the rural population. With more disposable income, they typically had larger SHS units 
and used the electricity for some productive uses such as lighting fishponds or small convenience 
shops. They were also often former owners of diesel-powered generators, glad to be using more 
economical systems. 
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However, we also encountered those respondents from lower-income households that had 
little or no source of lighting prior to their SHS units and had benefitted from either free 
government-funded SHS programs and/or the cheaper second hand SHS market rather than from 
participating directly in the project. One of these respondents commented that had it not been for 
the free SHS, he would have not minded to continue living in darkness. When combined with what 
PBs viewed as excessive bureaucratic borrowing requirements imposed by the World Bank, it is 
understandable why PBs considered the project “doable, but not bankable” and therefore 
impractical to warrant robust involvement. 
Instead, the project placed the burden of SHS commercialization almost entirely on 
inexperienced SHS dealers through its dealer-sales model. The project’s credit component as it 
stood made dealers and customers responsible for financing $66.8 million equivalent or almost 60 
percent of project costs, mainly through the payment of monthly installments. It seemingly 
distributed the investment risks of the credit facility among the different stakeholders involved, 
with the PBs bearing the dealer credit risk and the dealer bearing the consumer credit risk. 
However, because it was the dealers rather than the PBs, the WBG, or the government that were 
responsible for complex and arduous task of administering the loans to customers and monitoring 
compliance, it was also ultimately the dealers left with shouldering the financial risk of loan 
defaults. “It would have been far preferable for us that banks be in charge of the loans,” mentioned 
one respondent. “When banks are responsible for collecting payments, companies can focus on 
providing the SHS and related services.” 
5.3 Inadequate dealer capacity  
As PBs lacked the rural networks to deal directly with customers, a dealer-sales model was 
employed, whereby six Jakarta-based dealers were tasked to establish rural outlets and would take 
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responsibility for the procurement, sales, installation and maintenance of SHS units; and for 
offering term credit to make the systems more affordable to prospective customers. The eligibility 
criteria for dealers included proven business competence, the existence of sales or services 
infrastructure in the targeted markets, and a credit agreement with a PB (Martinot et al. 2001). 
 However, our data revealed that SHS dealers were mainly small and inexperienced 
enterprises in a nascent market, peddling an unfamiliar product and novel concept of electricity 
services. Deprived of their main source of investment capital from the very beginning due to the 
reluctance of PBs to offer credit, dealers were further constrained in their ability to finance and 
develop their businesses as the price of SHSs jumped three-fold following the drastic 
depreciation of Indonesian currency. This was especially true after the IBRD loan was 
terminated and dealers only had the option of using their own financing to continue their 
businesses.  “Without credit from the banks, we had to provide financing from our own pockets,” 
explained one respondent “This was very tough for small businesses like ours.” Even when sales 
targets were reduced from 200,000 to 70,000 units in 2001, dealers were still not able maintain 
sufficient inventories and establish the necessary rural outlets. As described by another 
respondent, “I had to cover three whole regencies with only one motorbike. It was an impossible 
job.” 
Rather than being allowed to focus on building a proper SHS supply chain and a rural 
service infrastructure, dealers also had to build their rural credit delivery and collection 
infrastructure – both requiring very different sets of skills and expertise. In this context, 
respondents felt strongly that “the magnitude of the installation targets was not comparable with 
the efforts to build capacity.” Apart from a few workshops that were limited to sending only a few 
staff at a time, there was very little support for dealers to upgrade their skills and expertise, develop 
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their businesses, approach banks for financing, learn about rural credit, and address problems on 
the ground. The grants provided by GEF did little to improve their “unsatisfactory” performance 
as the project required that dealers offer credit to their customers as a condition of eligibility to 
receive these grants. This caused problems for dealers who did not feel secure enough to borrow 
or extend credit. Moreover, as a respondent lamented, “A $100 for every SHS sold is not enough. 
They should have increased the grant amount after the crisis.” 
6. Discussion: Five Broader Lessons for Energy Access Programs 
Apart from offering a stark tale of contrasts, the ESDP and ISHSP offer five broader 
lessons for energy and development practitioners and researchers.  .   
6.1 Polycentric involvement of financial institutions   
The ESDP had a highly participatory project design involving the national utility, private 
developers, and local groups, and institutionalized stakeholder engagement with quarterly 
meetings and ad hoc consultations.  It reveals the usefulness of including a broad set of 
stakeholders in program implementation—from the communities themselves and NGOs to the 
commercial and public sectors.    The ESDP mobilized communities at the grassroots level, 
working with villagers, councils, provincial officials, and Electricity Consumer Societies.  This 
ensured project ownership on the part of communities and strengthened community capacity to 
effectively manage SHS, and it involved the financial and microfinance sector.  Unlike 
Indonesia, it selected strong PCIs with national networks, including commercial banks giving 
wholesale loans to firms as well as microfinance organizations, like SEEDs, to provide small-
scale household loans “where ordinary banks cannot.”  It also awarded grants and capacity 
building efforts to local manufacturers and distributors.  As one respondent put it, “The ESDP 
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was private sector oriented, not government sector oriented; if it was a government sponsored 
thing, it would not have worked as well, my guess is half the money would have gone into the 
pockets of politicians.” The ESDP in Sri Lanka had a strong AU behind it plus a collection of 
banks and trade and industry associations.  These included the Solar Industries Association and a 
Federation of Electricity Consumer Societies in addition to a dedicated NGO (Practical Action) 
and impassioned microfinance institution (SEEDS).    As one respondent explained, “one of the 
reasons the ESD succeeded is because the government stayed out—the private sector just ran 
with it, guided by the AU.”  Essentially, this involvement of diverse and heterogeneous actors 
ensured that “multiple layers of auditing and accountability” were created to sustain the project. 
In Indonesia, by contrast, the four PBs that had been selected were still unfamiliar with 
investments in the renewable energy sector and none of the six appointed SHS dealers had 
developed an effective supply chain and financial mechanism to deploy SHSs on the scale 
intended by the project. The solar PV market was still very much in its infancy and the project 
therefore needed greater government involvement to guarantee appropriate the institutional and 
regulatory environment.  Moreover, the ISHSP saw SHS vendors generally overwhelmed from 
having to provide credit lines to potential customers and collect installments to pay enough 
attention to after-sales services.  As a consequence, Indonesian customers had to be responsible 
for their own maintenance and servicing.  The credit component of the Indonesia SHS Project 
failed to adjust to the economic realities of the Asian Financial Crisis.  With little domestic 
manufacturing and assembly, the program was entirely dependent on foreign components, which 
meant the regional crisis saw the devaluation of Indonesian currency and a threefold increase in 
the costs of SHS systems.   
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The credit component of the Indonesia SHS project was designed to overcome the first 
cost barrier found to be critical in the uptake of capital-intensive technologies such as SHSs in 
rural areas (Miller and Hope 2000).  However, no stakeholder was willing to fully shoulder the 
investment risks of an unchartered rural market for solar PV technology. What was needed was a 
responsive financial infrastructure that provided several mechanisms to reduce the risk of 
investing in a new market and that allowed for greater flexibility to adapt business models to 
changing market signals. The Indonesia SHS Project did none of these things. 
Additionally, dealers decided to export systems out of Indonesia to take advantage of the 
strong US dollar, meaning the program in essence subsidized overseas investment rather than the 
domestic expansion of energy access.  The BPPT as the principle implementing agency did very 
little to adjust the project design to properly involve financial institutions, SHS vendors, and end-
users in the project – mainly letting the Asian Financial Crisis take its toll. As a result, at the end 
of the project, two out of the four participating banks had gone bust, only one out of the six 
approved SHS dealers remained in business, and only a disappointing 8,054 out of 200,000 sales 
were achieved.  
6.2 Flexibility in technological scope and geographic coverage  
The ESDP demonstrates the viability of flexibility in at least three senses.  One is a 
strategic flexibility involving where to extend the national grid, where to push for village hydro-
powered microgrids, and where to deploy isolated SHS units.  The ESDP promoted all three 
types of technologies—grid-connected, mini-grid, and off-grid—but only in particular areas, and 
never in the same place.   Another is that it had flexible business and financial models matched 
in scale to each of these three technologies.  For SHS units, the ESDP mostly supported solar 
dealers who formed credit partnerships with banks and microfinance institutions.  No “one size 
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fits all approach” was employed; instead the ESDP was “very targeted” and “differentiated.”  A 
third is the flexibility inherent in modifying and revising the program itself in the face of 
feedback and challenges.  When it became apparent that the SHS subcomponent was not meeting 
its targets, the scheme was revised and SEEDs brought in as a PCI.  Managers of the ESDP, as 
one respondent put it, “quickly and effectively responded to issues raised by stakeholders.”  
Another noted that the “beauty of the project is that it had the flexibility to acknowledge failures 
and change the rules, operating guidelines were inherently flexible and adaptable.”  
In Indonesia, planners pushed solar energy because expert consultants told them to, not 
because communities had expressed an organic demand for the technology.  It appears llittle 
effort was made to fully understand the true energy needs of the targeted population or to involve 
them in the project design.  According to respondents, there was never a study sufficiently done 
to assess whether the technology has been understood and accepted by the wider Indonesian 
population. In fact, many questioned the choice of SHSs in the first place, perceived by some as 
an unfamiliar technology “imposed on Indonesia” from the World Bank rather than a “need 
stemming from an expressed interest of the rural population.” Doubts were raised whether the 
technology was even suitable for sufficient solar irradiation considering frequent cloud cover, 
high levels of humidity in the tropics, and the fact that many of the remote areas targeted are in 
dense forest areas. In this regard, it was suggested that perhaps concentrated solar power or other 
renewable energy sources such as geothermal, hydro, or biogas could have been more 
appropriate solutions for rural electrification. 
Also, only one type of SHS was eligible, unlike the flexibility enshrined in the ESDP.  
The dismal sales of SHS units were not simply a reflection of reduced purchasing power of end-
users and retailers due to the Asian Financial Crisis. Many end-users did not place enough 
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importance on electrification. Moreover, competing government initiatives deploying SHS 
through grant mechanisms severely hampered the market-based approach of the program.  While 
end-users did not mind using SHS units, they naturally preferred waiting for government 
subsidies or buying from the cheaper second-hand market.  In this regard, the selection of 
provinces was based on a presumed rather than expressed need from the communities targeted. 
While the program did successfully develop technical specifications, testing, and certification, 
the inexperienced and disinterested BPPT was not able to translate these gains into opportunities 
for other stakeholders, especially fledging local SHS companies. 
The provinces chosen for potential target markets were also in question considering not 
many dealers had networks in Lampung and South Sulawesi at the beginning of the project. As a 
result, most were functionally excluded from taking part. Some respondents were of the opinion 
that the selection of the target areas was too ambitious, whereas others thought that the project 
could have included more provinces and did not do enough to leverage on the natural strongholds 
of many other competent SHS dealers. 
6.3 Political harmonization and support 
The ESDP affirms the salience of political harmonization in two ways: strong leadership 
from project champions, and alignment with other national policies and frameworks.   In terms 
of leadership, the ESDP thrived under a “strong,” “dedicated,” and “fiercely independent” AU, 
DFCC Bank, willing to “initially sustain losses from operations for the first three years.”  As one 
respondent explained, “one of the reasons the ESDP succeeded is because the government stayed 
out—the private sector just ran with it, guided by the AU.”  In terms of regulatory alignment, 
when the ESDP began, only the national utility CEB could generate power and off-grid 
generators were “technically illegal”.  Planners had to implement the entire “community and 
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village concept” and “IPP concept” from the “ground up,” changes which apparently even 
involved altering the Sri Lankan constitution.  The ESDP also worked closely with national 
planners and CEB officials to set tariffs, enact legislation, create a Sustainable Energy Authority, 
and an Energy Forum—culminating in what one respondent called “an extremely supportive 
policy environment.” 
 Indonesia demonstrates the opposite.  Government subsidies and price incentives gave 
the “wrong” signals, with other ongoing programs giving away solar panels for free and the 
government increasing subsidies for kerosene.  The national government expanded the grid to 
communities that had just purchased SHS units, flooding the secondary market and mitigating 
the desire for households to pay for systems.  Most respondents we interviewed criticized the 
continued prevalence of free SHSs provided through government-funded programs in parallel to 
the project. Some villagers we talked to in Lampung mentioned that they had preferred to wait 
for these free SHSs, even though stocks were limited and the waiting lists were long, rather than 
purchase their own units. Other villagers had continued to use kerosene lamps, benefiting from 
highly politicized government subsidies that were only stopped in 2000. 
A lack of coordination with PLN (the national state owned electric utility) was another 
problem as former customers living in target areas that were eventually abandoned by dealers due 
to the availability of grid electricity flooded the market with cheaper and less-regulated second-
hand SHSs. Many villagers we interviewed during our field visits admitted that they had gotten 
their systems from this second-hand market. These respondents stated that they preferred to receive 
“inferior goods” rather than pay the premium for a new system. Considering the well-known fact 
of inadequate after-sales services – which at some point became practically non-existent after all 
but one dealer remained in business during the project – it was perhaps not a poor choice to make. 
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6.4 Capacity building and awareness  
The ESDP built capacity through grants, technical assistance, and outreach in a variety of 
ways, many of which proved to be very effective.  It facilitated feasibility and pre-investment 
studies of household energy use as well as renewable resource potential.  It did initial market 
surveys to ask communities what they wanted, and to determine their willingness to pay (if any) 
for electricity.  These studies improved local capabilities and the understanding of markets, 
strengthened community knowledge of resources, and aided in cost recovery. They, in the words 
of one respondent, ensured that “market principles, based on sound economic data, determined 
the proper course of action for each community.”  The ESDP improved the capacity of PCIs so 
that their turnaround time for loans dropped from more than three months to less than one month.  
It implemented technical standards to improve the quality of Sri Lankan technology and 
ultimately protect consumers.  These preempted common problems related to over-usage, 
misusage, maintenance and repairs were less common and more easily addressed when they did 
occur.  These standards also “ensured the quality, safety, and longevity” of the equipment 
involved in the ESDP.  The ESDP supported the construction of 80 service centers for solar 
equipment so that the maintenance needs of rural households were always cared for.  Finally, it 
implemented a string of awareness raising activities so that educated consumers could make 
informed purchase decisions—whether it was an small independent power manager 
contemplating a micro-hydro project, a village leader thinking about off-grid hydro, or a 
household considering a SHS.  These included demonstrations, advertising campaigns, 
workshops, and seminars. 
The ESDP awareness campaign in particular targeted provincial officials and village 
decision makers and trained them in basic renewable energy concepts, financial options, and 
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feasibility studies; once they were ready to consider systems, it facilitated workshops on 
appropriate designs.  It also sponsored classes at the National Engineering and Research Institute 
and local technical colleges.  It promoted a national advertising campaign entitled Gamata Light 
run by the Sri Lanka Business Development Centre which featured newspaper ads, television 
ads, and radio broadcasts promoting SHS.   One of them is shown in Figure 5.  These awareness 
efforts were not “one way.”  The ESDP also sought feedback from households, village energy 
committees, and operators themselves through formal surveys and informal workshops.  Based 
on this feedback, planners learned that common problems facing the SHS subcomponent were 
improper battery charging, wiring defects, loose connections, and incorrect mounting of the solar 
panel.   
Figure 5: Part of the Gamata Light Campaign Showing the Value of ESDP-affiliated 
Electricity 
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In Indonesia, however, capacity building was underutilized.  The program spent 95 
percent of its budget on technology and only five percent on capacity building.  Due to limited 
funds, dealers were not able to afford television or radio commercials or even brochures. Thus, in 
order to reach as many people as possible, usually a technician would make a presentation in 
each village community center, followed by a technical demonstration. “It was always a very 
formal affair,” explained one respondent. “It was very important to ensure that the village chief 
is present in this presentation, to give him respect. If you are able to convince him regarding the 
importance of the SHS and the legitimacy of your business, it is easier to approach and educate 
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other villagers.” These marketing campaigns, scarce and homegrown as they were, were all too 
infrequent. 
6.5 Programmatic self-sufficiency  
 Lastly, and critically, the ESDP cultivated a self-sustaining market for SHS (that no 
longer needed the program to thrive, at least until massive investments in grid electrification 
occurred after the end of the project) whereas the ISHSP was all too dependent on government 
largesse.    
The ESDP cultivated commercial viability by ensuring that technologies were not “given 
away” and by sharing costs among its stakeholders.  It forcefully demonstrates that households 
are willing to pay more than they usually do for energy expenditures as long as their supply is 
reliable and safe.  It altered the energy development approach of the government from a “dole 
out” mentality to one based on “sustainable markets,” one requiring that communities participate 
themselves in hydro and solar projects by offering not only their cash but also labor and 
materials; and one demanding higher than usual returns on investment, always in the double digit 
range.  This focus on commercial viability did three things: it created a sense of community 
ownership, it meant end-users no longer viewed energy services as a “charity” or “free 
entitlement,” and it largely resulted in a market for renewable energy that could sustain itself 
after the ESDP ended. 
In Indonesia, by comparison, BPPT’s success in testing and certification of SHSs did not 
translate into better capacity building opportunities for other stakeholders. “BPPT was in a very 
privileged position. As the focal point of the project, it benefited from all capacity building 
efforts. But it did not encourage other elements of the market to grow,” criticized one 
respondent. The premature closing of the IBRD loan, which resulted in all but one dealer going 
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out of business, also indicates that dealers were not successful in developing the capacity to enter 
the market without project support let alone being able to independently catalyze commercial 
demand for solar PV technology. “There was a large vacuum in the solar PV market until 2005,” 
described another respondent. 
7. Conclusion 
 In sum, the success of Sri Lanka’s ESDP contrasted with the failure of Indonesia’s ISHSP 
reminds us forcefully that a similar market-based approach to energy access and solar 
electrification—in this case, one adopted by the World Bank—can produce drastically different 
effects.  How? 
Sri Lanka’s ESDP exhibits the strength of having a well-designed financial model and 
credit facility, a dedicated implementing agency, and stakeholder participation and capacity 
building.    The ESDP allowed end-users to take charge of their electricity needs in the absence of 
government provision, reaching villages which would have otherwise not have received electricity 
services. It improved the financial status of many rural villages and resulted in productive activities 
such as sewing and carpentry; and also substantially lessened consumption of kerosene, producing 
public health benefits.  It benefited from cost-sharing among development donors, financial 
institutions, vendors, and end-users – tailoring financial requirements for different stakeholders 
and project components. In other words, a demand-driven approach was adopted to design multiple 
financial models to suit multiple stakeholder needs rather than purely “free money.” 
The ISHSP in Indonesia failed to overcome first cost barriers, secure sufficient government 
involvement, and engender long-term sustainability. It suffered from an improperly designed 
financial model that calculated risks and incentives poorly, limited capacity building for local 
stakeholders, and minimal effort to inquire about what Indonesian end-users desired or needed – 
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as they were merely seen as passive energy consumers. The Indonesian government was almost 
totally uncoordinated in the implementation of the project. Private sector players and financial 
institutions lacked knowledge about solar energy and were risk averse, and many users remained 
uninformed about SHS or uninterested in electricity altogether. In essence, the Indonesia SHS 
Project failed because it did not adapt or adjust to local circumstances and needs. 
The confluence of success and failure—effective versus flawed financing vehicles, adequate 
versus poorly structured SHS supply chains, and harmonized versus fragmented government 
policy—remind us that promoting energy access and responding to energy poverty are highly 
contextual.   It means one must unpack what is meant by “market based” as well—what types of 
markets, structured under what governance conditions, subject to which management pressures, 
based on which technologies?  Thus, the efficacy of market based solutions for solar electrification 
are dependent on a mix of circumstance, technological learning, policy efficacy, program 
leadership, capacity building, and user awareness.  Even a highly influential actor such as the 
World Bank sees its agency and efficacy atrophied in the face of such contextual specificities. 
Without the proper alignment of economic, technical, and political factors, even those projects 
with the best intentions can quickly fail to achieve their goals. 
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9. Abbreviations and Acronyms  
 
$ - Denotes United States dollar unless otherwise indicated  
AU – Administrative Unit  
BPPT - Agency for the Development and Implementation of Technology (in Indonesia)  
CEB – Ceylon Electricity Board  
DFCC - Development Finance Corporation of Ceylon (in Sri Lanka) 
ESDP - Energy Services Delivery Project (in Sri Lanka) 
GDP – gross domestic product  
GEF – Global Environment Facility  
GWh - Gigawatt-hour  
IBRD - International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
ISHSP - Indonesia Solar Home System Project  
kW - kilowatt  
LIPI -  Indonesian Institute of Sciences 
LOLC - Lankia Orix Leasing Company (in Sri Lanka) 
MEMR - Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (in Indonesia)  
MENRISTEK - Ministry of Research and Technology (in Indonesia)  
MW - megawatt  
MWp – megawatt-peak  
NGO – nongovernmental organization  
NPL – non-performing loan  
PB - participating bank  
PCI – Participating Credit Institution  
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PLN - Perusahaan Listrik Negara 
PV = photovoltaic  
SEEDS - Sarvodaya Economic Enterprises Development Service 
SHS – Solar Home System 
SHSs – Solar Home Systems  
SPPA - small power purchase agreements 
WBG – World Bank Group  
Wp - Watt-peak  
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